Determined (& III)

What do we give up along with free will? The dizziness of (in)existence

The main conclusions from what we have seen in the first two installments of this extensive review is that evolution has produced a continuum of biological elements and environmental influences that leaves no loopholes through which some free will can slip. However, while it is accepted that bodily attributes and aptitudes are constituted by biological matter, character, resilience, mental fortitude, courage and other traits of similar status are preferably attributed to a soul or equivalent entity.

By virtue of their chaotic character, much of what will occur in a living system at an instant subsequent to an initial observation cannot be predicted. As complex, living systems give rise to emergent, new, phenomena whose characteristics cannot be predicted from those of their constituent elements. And as with the rest of matter, strange quantum phenomena occur at the subatomic levels of living entities; moreover, randomness reigns at these levels.

However, in the progression of a chaotic system every interaction is deterministic, not capricious. Moreover, no matter how new and unexpected the emergent features of a living system may be, its component parts cannot transcend their biological limitations to contain phenomena that, like free will, escape their rules. And although random (indeterministic) events seem to occur at the subatomic level, it is not possible for the strangeness of that level to percolate to the point of influencing behavior; moreover, the randomness inherent in the quantum level is not the best possible ally of a conscious and free agent. Would we leave decisions in the hands of chance?

In the last chapters of Determined, Sapolsky analyzes, on the one hand, what, in his opinion, are the root causes of the resistance to accept that there is no free will or free acts and, on the other hand, the psychological, moral, legal and social consequences that their acceptance would imply. This part of the book draws more on historical cases of crimes (real or not), prosecutions and executions, and the recent evolution of episodes like these. It also assesses the psychological difficulty in assuming and accepting that we do not act consciously and freely.

Contrary to what some propose and some studies seem to suggest, it is not true that those who do not believe in free will behave less prosocially than those who do; nor are they more immoral. But it is true that prosociality manifests itself differently and the bases of morality are different in some and in others.

The author, as I pointed out earlier, makes a historical review of the real consequences that have been derived from the practically universal belief in free will. Matters such as the attribution to epileptic persons of the status of demoniacs, or the treatment given in the Middle Ages to lepers, fortunately already overcome, exemplify the dangers of attributing a voluntary character to the acts of those affected. Still in the twentieth century, conditions such as autism and ADHD have been attributed by certain "experts" to the attitude of mothers during pregnancy or the first years of life of babies, casting upon them an absolutely undeserved guilt.

Sapolsky argues, from his conclusions –based on behavioral neuroendocrinology and evolution– and the teachings of history, that criminal justice based on retributive or even restorative principles is radically unjust, since it attributes guilt to subjects whose actions were the consequence of the long and complex sequence of causal relationships that led to decisions judged guilty and criminal. Instead of a criminal justice system based on these principles, he proposes to adopt a model based on quarantines, to protect society from people who have caused evil and are believed to be capable of causing it again.

However, human beings are very reluctant to accept the consequences, of various sorts, that would follow from assuming that we do not act freely. To begin with, our prosocial condition is based on mechanisms that favor the punishment of cheaters. That is why we are satisfied that those who do not comply with the rules or act badly are punished. It is a deeply rooted feeling.

In this context, and because punishment always entails costs, the (good or bad) reputation is very useful, because people who do not comply gain a bad reputation, and this makes others unwilling to cooperate with them, thus avoiding the need for punishment. But this does not eliminate the satisfaction produced by the punishment of cheaters, which has social significance, since it hinders the possible implementation of a non-retributive penal system.

Sapolsky, however, believes that this is something we are already doing, as exemplified by some of the cases he discusses in the book. He argues that we can eliminate the belief that actions are freely and voluntarily chosen as we become more knowledgeable, more reflective and more modern. And that this makes for a better world.

In the final chapter Sapolsky adopts a more philosophical discourse. He says that what the science in this book teaches is that there is no meaning. There is no answer to "Why" beyond "This happened because of what happened just before, which happened because of what happened just before that." There is nothing but an empty, indifferent Universe in which, occasionally, atoms come together temporarily to form things we each call Self.

Yet we human beings have survived and progressed thanks, in part, to having developed a robust capacity for self-deception. And this certainly includes a belief in free will.

Rejecting the idea of free will leaves us with an incomprehensible and unacceptable picture of humanity, since there is no moral responsibility and obligation. Giving that up is very difficult. It will be very difficult to convince people that a ruthless murderer deserves no blame. But that is nothing next to the difficulty of convincing people that they themselves do not deserve to be praised if they have done a good deed or topped their course at university.

There is no justifiable "deservedness," according to the author. The only possible moral conclusion is that you are no more entitled than any other human being to have your needs and desires met. That there is no human being who is less worthy than you to have your welfare considered. You may think otherwise, because you cannot conceive of the threads of causality beneath the surface that made you who you are, because you have the luxury of deciding that effort and self-discipline are not made of biology, because you have surrounded yourself with people who think the same.

I found this last part of the book brilliant. When he has already gone through the biology and other scientific disciplines behind his thesis, he addresses the underlying motivations for refusing to give up on considering ourselves free and responsible.

In all these pages I have only missed a more direct reference to the self, that entity that is created by our nervous system and to which we insist on attributing agency and freedom. That entity is part of the deception. The biological machine that dictates behavior needs to deceive itself in order to survive. And yet, as Sapolsky says, we should be able to assume that we are one of those things that are formed when a set of atoms temporarily come together, an absolute fluke, a minuscule accident in the becoming of the universe, with no special purpose or meaning.

I suspect that when the biological machine accepts its condition as a machine, with all its consequences, and overcomes the dizziness of existential emptiness, life, stripped of merit and guilt, will be more worthy of being lived.

Note: Yo can find the first and second part of this review here (the first part) and here (the second one).

Title: Determined–Life Without Free Will

Author: Robert M. Sapolsky

Ed. by Vintage, 2023.